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Abstract: 
Purpose – Megachurches are thriving in religious markets at a time when 
Americans are asserting their ability as consumers of religious products to 
engage in religious switching. The apparent success of megachurches, which 
often provide a low cost and low commitment path by which religious 
refugees may join the church, seems to challenge Iannocconne's theory that 
high commitment churches will thrive while low commitment churches will 
atrophy. This paper aims to investigate this issue. 
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Design/methodology/approach – This paper employs a signaling model to 
illustrate the strategy and organizational forms megachurches employ to 
indicate a match between what the church produces and the religious refugee 
wishes to consume in an effort to increase their membership. The model 
illustrates that megachurches expect little in regard to financial or time 
commitment of new attendees. However, once the attendees perceive a good 
fit with the church, the megachurch increases its expectation of commitment. 
Data from the FACT2000 survey provide evidence in support of the model's 
predictions. 
 
Findings – Data from the FACT2000 survey provide evidence in support of 
the model's predictions. 
 
Originality/value – The paper serves to illustrate the dynamic process by 
which megachurches attract new attendees and transform those that find a 
good fit between their needs and what the church offers into full members of 
the church. 
 
Keywords: Megachurches, Quality signalling, Religion, Organizational 
analysis, United States of America 
I. Introduction 
Megachurches are thriving in religious markets at a time when 
Americans are asserting their ability as consumers of religious 
products to engage in religious switching. Survey results from the 
latest Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2008) study of the US 
religious landscape find that religious affiliation in the US is very 
diverse and extremely fluid. Kosmin and Keysar (2006) find that 
individuals are not only increasingly changing their church 
membership, but also their denominational affiliation, or deciding not 
to attend services at all. 
The increased trend of religious switching allows some churches 
to gain attendees while others lose attendees. In the five years 
between 2000 and 2005, the number of megachurches in the US 
doubled, growing to 1,250. At the same time average attendance at 
megachurches grew 57 percent, from 2,279 to 3,585 (Thumma et al., 
2005). Taken together, these facts suggest that megachurches are 
successfully competing with other churches to attract and retain 
members. 
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This paper examines the seeker‐oriented megachurch which 
have recently grown in number and often come to mind when 
megachurches are discussed (e.g. Bill Hybels Willow Creek Community 
Church in Illinois or Rick Warren's Saddleback Church in Orange 
County, CA). Seeker‐oriented megachurches typically target religious 
refugees, or seekers, in order to grow. These individuals either were 
never members of a church, or were members of a church but for a 
variety of reasons no longer actively affiliate with it. Some do not 
attend services or participate in other ways, but maintain an affiliation 
in name only, while others have switched to identifying with no religion 
at all. Warren (1995) deliberately built Saddleback by targeting 
seekers. 
Iannacconne (1994) employs a club good model to describe the 
success of relatively strict denominations. He argues that the 
satisfaction an individual receives from participating in a religion is, in 
part, a function of how much other attendees also participate. He 
makes the case that strict churches (churches that require significant 
self sacrifice or stigmatization) enjoy a competitive advantage over 
liberal denominations by minimizing free riding. The logic being that 
those inclined to free riding would not attend a church that has such 
high expectations of active engagement with the church. As a result, 
strict churches will create incentives that promote full participation 
among its members, thereby raising everyone's utility. 
The success of seeker‐oriented megachurches, which typically 
have low commitment expectations for newcomers, raises the question 
of what strategy they employ to attract and retain these seekers while 
still fulfilling the needs of members who have a deeper connection to 
the church. This paper evaluates a potential strategy megachurches 
may pursue to signal the high quality experience they can provide to 
seekers. It suggests that the church requires little of seekers in terms 
of time, effort, and donations early in their affiliation with the church. 
This allows the seekers to attend services anonymously as free riders, 
providing them an opportunity to see if what the megachurch offers 
fits their needs. It also suggests that after the seeker consumes the 
church's religious product and discovers a good fit, the church can 
then increase its expectations and require more time, effort, and 
donations of the new attendee, thereby reducing on going free riding 
while still maintaining membership. Taken together, these suggest 
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that the megachurch deliberately accommodates the varying needs of 
an individual at different stages of their affiliation with the church. 
Using the FACT 2000 survey, we show that the model's outcomes are 
consistent with stylized facts suggested by the survey responses. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
provides an overview of trends in religious switching in the US as well 
as a general overview of characteristics of megachurches. Section III 
presents a model of quality signaling to explain how megachurches 
successfully attract and retain seekers. Section IV evaluates the 
model's predictions in light of survey responses comparing 
megachurches to non‐megachurches and Section V concludes. 
II. Successful churches, religious trends in the 
US, and megachurches 
Thumma et al. (2005), Bird (2007), and Thumma and Travis 
(2007) represent the most comprehensive surveys of megachurches 
and also allow for comparisons of megachurches to non‐
megachurches. Thumma and Travis (2007) estimate that there are 
1,250 megachurches in a market of 335,000 congregations. This 
number represents a 100 percent growth between 2000 and 2005. 
Such growth is also continuing as they estimate that approximately 
100 new megachurches are established each year. 
This paper specifically focuses on the seeker‐oriented 
megachurch. These have been on the rise since the 1990s and often 
come to mind when megachurches are discussed. Rick Warren's 
Saddleback Church is likely one of the best known examples of a 
seeker‐oriented megachurch. These megachurches attempt to appeal 
to individuals previously turned off by organized religion, trying to 
connect with people who have abandoned or have remained outside of 
a traditional faith. They often downplay denominational affiliation and 
traditional religious services. Instead, they rely on a modern look (e.g. 
a mall or college campus), have music driven by drums and electric 
guitars, and frequently employ multimedia during a service. 
Churches active in the market for followers will naturally 
compete with one another to gain members. Results from both the 
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Pew study (2008) of the US religious landscape and Kosmin and 
Keysar's (2006) study of the US religious marketplace find strong 
evidence that individuals are employing their rights as consumers to 
switch religious affiliation or even abandon religion altogether. The 
Pew study finds that 28 percent of American adults have left the faith 
in which they were raised for another faith or left religion 
altogether[1]. Further, the survey finds that 16.1 percent of American 
adults are unaffiliated with any religion. This proportion is even larger 
for the younger demographic: for 18‐29 years olds, a full 25 percent 
identify themselves as unaffiliated. Of all US adults claiming no 
affiliation, the split between those that are “religious unaffiliated” 
(people that say religion is somewhat or very important in their lives 
yet have no affiliation) and “secular unaffiliated” (people that say 
religion is not important in their lives) is nearly the same (5.8 percent 
vs 6.3 percent). 
Kosmin and Keysar (2006) further note that there is a 
significant group of adults that identify with a church but do not 
affiliate. They estimate that 81 percent of American adults identify 
with a religious group, but just over one‐half live in households in 
which someone is currently a member of a church. They also comment 
that 30 percent of those who affiliate with a religion have no tie to a 
congregation. 
These surveys suggest that, in addition to those who declare 
themselves as not belonging to any religion, there are many adults 
who affiliate in name only, but have no ties to actually attending a 
particular service. Individuals belonging to these groups (religious 
unaffiliated and those having left a religion) are the key focus of 
seeker‐oriented megachurches in their efforts to evangelize and grow. 
Given the increased trend of religious switching and the pool of 
people who are less connected to a religion, Thumma (1996) suggests 
megachurches are well poised for growth. As churches exist in an 
increasingly dynamic religious environment of empowered consumers, 
the megachurch has formed itself as a flexible institution. Thumma 
(1996) argues that megachurches are different than other spiritual 
organizations in that they demonstrate a new pattern of 
congregational life that changes with American society. In addition to 
the characteristics mentioned before, megachurches typically offer 
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multiple services, employ different styles of services to target various 
interests in their congregation, and some even have multiple branches 
to serve their members. Megachurch leaders often employ business 
models and poll people to better understand what potential and actual 
members want. As a religious organization these practices allow them 
to excel at intentionally instituting procedures to help newcomers 
become integrated in the church while not alienating members who 
have deepened their affiliation with the church (Thumma and Travis, 
2007). 
While most are evangelical, many megachurches downplay their 
denomination affiliation, at least while hosting activities that are 
intended for new(er) attendees. As Warren (1995, p. 199) notes, 
Saddleback is doctrinally and financially affiliated with the Southern 
Baptist Convention (SBC). However, due to his concern that 
widespread misperceptions about the SBC would inhibit seekers from 
attending, he decided on a strategy to attract the seekers first and 
only later educate them about the SBC. His argument is that after 
seekers have found a good fit between their needs and what the 
church offers they will be open to be educated about the SBC. Unlike 
other churches, megachurches are organized to encourage growth by 
allowing the new attendee to participate as a “free rider” with very 
little or no expectation to tithe, volunteer time, or even learn about the 
church's doctrines. However, Warren is careful to note that the free 
riding cannot continue indefinitely. As he states, Saddleback Church 
requires, “[…] a major commitment from those who want to join our 
Church” (p. 54). Thus, once new attendees deepen their connection 
with the church, significant expectations are placed on their behavior 
in terms of tithing, volunteering, etc. 
This approach provides an interesting case to consider in light of 
past work which emphasizes the need to restrict free riding in religious 
activities. Seeker‐oriented megachurches are appropriate to study in 
this light since they intentionally vary their expectations of new 
attendees relative to members of the megachurch. In an effort to 
accommodate the perceived needs of seekers, they require very little 
of new attendees and strategically offer activities (often in secular 
based interests) to make it “easy” to attend. They do this while 
eliciting significant dedication and sacrifice among members of the 
church. As Thumma (1996) suggests, megachurches have directly 
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responded to changes in our culture and in a sense accommodate it 
with a distinct and deliberate response in terms of how they are 
organized, initiate programs, and influence member relations. 
The approach taken by seeker‐oriented megachurches to attract 
seekers often leads to a common misconception that megachurches 
are a “low commitment” religion where members join with limited 
contributions of time, effort, or money and that their level of 
commitment never grows. It is true that lower ascriptive loyalties 
combined with megachurches' efforts to provide a personalized 
religious message have allowed them to reach out to seekers in order 
to provide a church with low entry costs that speaks to individual 
needs. In fact, many seeker‐oriented megachurches make significant 
efforts along these lines to become the path by which these individuals 
reconnect with God. However, though no commitment is initially 
expected, at some point the church increases its expectations of those 
who attend. It appears that this strategy ultimately works because 
many attendees eventually become members, leading to the 
megachurch growth discussed earlier. According to Thumma et al. 
(2005), megachurches are among the most successful churches today 
in attracting and retaining members, suggesting that they foster on‐
going commitment and involvement of their members. 
If we consider the apparent strategy megachurches employ 
when requiring no commitment early, but more after the individual is 
connected to the church, it seems as though the megachurch is 
drawing new members in by charging a low price to experience the 
religious product, and then increasing the price after the individual 
recognizes the quality of the religious product and deepens their 
commitment to the church. 
This process is clearly a different approach than that of 
traditional churches seeking to minimize free riding by requiring 
significant commitments from members throughout their association 
with the church. Iannaccone (1992, 1994) makes the case that strict 
churches are the ones most likely to grow and succeed in a 
competitive marketplace. He argues that participating in a religion is 
like a club good in that the utility an individual derives from 
participating is a function of, among other things, the degree to which 
others also participate. The public good aspect, however, of such an 
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activity can engender free riding. Thus, to minimize such behavior, a 
strict church will attract committed members and thereby minimize the 
free‐riding problem. Consequently, strict churches will be successful 
while lax churches will weaken. Kosmin and Keysar's (2006) results 
find some support for Iannaccone's predictions. On the one hand, 
strict, or high cost, groups such as Born Again Christians and 
Pentecostals, have indeed seen significant growth. On the other hand, 
less strict or lower cost groups such as Presbyterians, United Churches 
of Christ, and Methodists have declining memberships. Megachurches, 
however, present an interesting case in that they seem to encourage 
free riding, at least early in a person's association with the church, and 
yet are growing. 
III. A model of quality signaling to attract 
seekers 
Given the above discussion, we view a seeker‐oriented 
megachurch as a unique religious organization whose strategy is to 
market to the needs of religious refugees, or seekers, who are 
dissatisfied with their previous religious affiliation. To target these 
individuals, the seeker‐oriented megachurch must find a way to signal 
their commitment to the quality, or fit, of their religious product in 
order to attract a seeker to the service. Only by bringing seekers into 
the megachurch, does the megachurch have the opportunity to 
demonstrate that it can be a high‐quality fit with the seeker's tastes 
and preferences and begin the process of deepening that individual's 
relationship with the church. 
It is precisely this challenge of signaling that provides our 
motivation for characterizing the apparent pricing strategy of the 
seeker‐oriented megachurch within a quality signaling model (for 
extensive coverage of signaling, see Kreps and Sobel (1994)). 
Specifically, we adapt Tirole's (1995) two‐period quality signaling 
model to illustrate how a megachurch might distinguish itself from 
non‐megachurches in its ability to offer a high‐quality fit experience 
that is dissimilar from that of a competing organization that offers a 
low‐quality fit for the seeker. 
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We assume the seekers the megachurch hopes to attract are 
religious refugees. That is, individuals who either have no religious 
affiliation, or state an affiliation but do not attend religious services. In 
this sense, we are not making a comment on the actual quality of 
various churches or denominations. Instead, we use the notion of 
quality or fit in the model to suggest a match between the seeker's 
tastes and preferences and the religious product offered by a church 
(or producer). We identify two qualities of fit of a religious good. The 
high‐quality fit closely matches and satisfies the tastes and preferences 
of some of these seekers while the low‐quality fit is not a match for 
any of the seekers (of course the low‐quality fit religious good may 
well satisfy the tastes and preferences of the non‐seekers, but this is 
not the market segment we are examining). 
The interaction between the church and the seeker is structured 
such that the church charges a price for an individual to consume the 
religious product in each period of the two‐period game (p1 and p2). 
We interpret the “price” of a religious product along the lines of 
Ekelund et al. (2006) as the full price of religion. This includes the time 
required to attend, effort required to fulfill church expectations such as 
service to others, and donations and tithing expected by the church. 
The individual has the following utility function: 
U = αs – pt if the individual attends the church, or 
0 if the individual does not attend, 
(1) 
where t=1, 2, α is a taste parameter, s denotes the quality of fit, and 
p is the full price. The taste parameter α is distributed over the 
population of individuals with the cumulative distribution f(α). The 
population is normalized at unity. For simplicity, we assume there are 
no new entrants of consumers or producers in period 2. 
There are two incumbent producers of distinct religious products 
from which the seeker may choose. In this setting, the high‐quality fit 
product, sh, is a match for some seekers, while the low‐quality fit 
product, sl, not a match for any seeker. (We therefore implicitly set the 
value of sl equal to zero.) The quality of fit of the religious product 
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offered by each producer is known to the producer but not known to 
the individual – prior to consuming the product in the first period – and 
can only be learned by attending a church service and determining if 
the religious good is a high‐quality fit or low‐quality fit. In this sense, 
the religious product is an experience good. 
Let γ denote the a priori probability that either product is a 
match for the individual. Accordingly, γ is the proportion of repeats in 
the second period at the high‐quality fit producer. Because the low‐
quality fit is not a match for any seeker, the low‐quality fit producer 
does not have any individual that repeats in the second period. For 
simplicity, only those who attend in period 1 can attend in period 2. 
Thus, in the second period when quality is known to seekers, the high‐
quality fit producer will provide a service to a proportion, γ, of those 
who attend in period one, while the low‐quality church will not. The 
high‐ and low‐quality fit products are produced at different unit costs 
denoted as ch and cl, respectively. We make two assumptions on costs. 
First, it is assumed that the unit cost of producing the high‐quality fit 
product is greater than that of the low‐quality fit product, 𝑐ℎ ≥ 𝑐𝑙. 
Second, it is economically efficient to produce that high quality good, 
and so 𝛼𝑠ℎ ≥ 𝑐ℎ. 
For simplicity, the church and the individual have the same 
discount rate, δ, which is used to discount the second‐period “profits” 
of the high‐quality fit producer. It follows that the total discounted 
profit of the high‐quality fit producer is:  
Πℎ  =  (𝑝1 – 𝑐ℎ)  +  𝛾𝛿(𝑝2 − 𝑐ℎ)  ≥  0. 
(2) 
The discounted profit of the high‐quality fit producer depends not only 
on costs of production and the discount rate, but also the prices 
charged in each period and the proportion of satisfied or repeat 
individuals. The first‐period price is important because the seeker‐
oriented church needs to attract potential members in period one so 
they might learn about the quality of the product. It follows that if the 
low‐quality fit producer mimics the first‐period price strategy of the 
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high‐quality fit producer and charges price p1, the low‐quality fit 
producer's profit, which occurs in the first period only, is equal to:  
∏𝑙  =  𝑝1 – 𝑐𝑙  ≥  0.  
(3) 
Equation (3) represents the cost advantage to the low‐quality fit 
producer. To ensure that the low‐quality fit producer does not profit at 
the high‐quality fit producer's expense, the high‐quality producer 
would ensure in period 1 that 𝑝1 ≤ 𝑐𝑙. Subtracting equation (3) from 
equation (2) therefore yields the constraint faced by the high‐quality fit 
producer:  
∏ℎ  =  𝛾𝛿(𝑝2 − 𝑐ℎ) – (𝑐ℎ – 𝑐𝑙)  ≥  0.  
(4) 
Two important points emerge from equation (4). First, in words, in 
order for the high‐quality fit producer to use the first‐period price as a 
signaling mechanism, it must be that the discounted profits from 
repeat individuals exceeds the cost differential[2]. Second, it follows 
that for the inequality to hold, it must be that the second‐period full‐
information price that the profit‐maximizing high‐quality fit producer 
would charge, αsh, is greater than unit cost, ch. 
In light of the above constraints, the optimal strategy for the 
high quality church is to price the religious product it offers equal to 
the low quality church's cost in the first period. Under these 
circumstances, a low quality church would not mimic a high quality 
church because it could not earn a positive profit doing so. Thus, the 
high quality church can signal its commitment to offer a high‐quality fit 
product and thereby separate itself from a low quality church by 
charging a low quality price in the first period (p1=cl). 
The high quality church could recoup (at least) its first period 
loss in the second period by charging a sufficiently high price. In the 
second period, the profit‐maximizer can charge a full‐information price 
equal to αsh. The first component of equation (4), γδ (p2−ch), implies 
p2=αsh≥ch≥cl = p1, and, therefore, period 2 price must be higher than 
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period 1 price. In other words, period 1 price is an introductory price 
as it is lower than the full‐information price charged in the second 
period. Thus, the church will expect its attendees to pay more in the 
second period when the returning attendee has discovered that the 
church provides a good fit. This may take the form of higher 
expectations of monetary offerings, higher expectations of 
participation, and higher expectations of personal practices (e.g. 
behaving in a manner consistent with church teachings). Note that the 
quality of the product, sh, is an important determinant of the price 
difference between period 1 and period 2 and, therefore, profit as well. 
Hence, the profit‐maximizing producer does not scrimp on quality in 
the second period. 
IV. Empirical evidence 
The model suggests that megachurches succeed in attracting 
and retaining seekers by requiring little of them early in their 
association with the church, but after the high quality (good fit) of 
their services is experienced, the church can expect more of the 
attendees. Thus, the price a seeker‐oriented megachurch charges is 
low initially, but then rises after the quality of the service is known[3]. 
Given that megachurches have only recently garnered 
significant attention among academics, empirical researchers have 
been hindered by a shortage of data. The data employed in this study 
come from the Faith Communities Today 2000 (FACT 2000) survey. 
The data were made available by the Association of Religion Data 
archives, www.TheArda.com, and were collected by Roozen (2000)[4]. 
Given the importance of the FACT 2000 survey, we briefly 
describe the survey before we evaluate the empirical results. The FACT 
2000 survey is the largest survey of congregations in the US. It is also 
allows for the first systematic study of megachurches. FACT 2000 
allows researchers to investigate a variety of congregational 
characteristics including their number and style of services, 
programming efforts, and many aspects of congregational life. Bird 
(2007) notes that the survey measures 280 variables, and the 
responses represent 41 denominations and faith groups 
(approximately 90 percent of all US congregations and faiths). The 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
International Journal of Social Economics, Vol 39, No. 5 (March 2012): pg. 357-372. DOI. This article is © Emerald Group 
Publishing, Ltd. and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald Group 
Publishing, Ltd. does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without 
the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing, Ltd.. 
13 
 
survey was mailed and averaged over a 50 percent return rate, 
resulting in approximately 14,000 returned surveys. The survey was 
completed by a “key informant”. Each institution was free to choose 
who this person would be, but was in almost all cases the senior 
religious figure, or in their absence, the senior lay leader. 
Our data analysis consists of comparing the responses of 
megachurches to non‐megachurches on a number of issues related to 
our hypotheses on pricing. To conduct the analysis, we first separate 
megachurches from non‐megachurches. We apply the definition of 
megachurches being Protestant churches with weekly attendees of 
2,000 or more. FACT 2000 classifies denominations as belonging to 
one of the following categories: Liberal Protestant, Moderate 
Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Historic Black, Catholic and 
Orthodox, or other. Our megachurch subset thus includes Liberal, 
Moderate, and Evangelical Protestant congregations with 2,000 or 
more attendees. The non‐megachurch sample includes Catholic and 
Orthodox, Historic Black churches, and “other”[5]. Of these returns, 
the survey received 120 usable responses from megachurches and 
13,259 usable responses from non‐megachurches. 
To examine the change in prices, it simplifies our analysis to 
know that megachurches essentially offer services to non‐members at 
close to a zero price. Warren (1995) notes that as he established 
Saddleback, during offerings he stated that the offering was only 
expected of members of the church family. Non‐members were and 
are not expected to give. Both Warren (1995) and Thumma and Travis 
(2007) mention that seeker‐oriented megachurches understand 
seekers want anonymity and pastors wish to provide the required 
anonymity. Naturally, megachurches would then not make 
requirements of additional time and effort of seekers getting 
acquainted with the church early in their affiliation. Thus, what 
remains to add empirical content to our model is to consider the 
available data to investigate other measurable ways in which the 
megachurch can reduce the whole price of affiliation for new or non‐
members and then raise the price as a person's affiliation with the 
megachurch deepens. 
As mentioned above, the FACT 2000 survey contains questions 
regarding many aspects of the congregation's life. Some areas 
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examined include the number of services offered at various times, the 
variety of styles of services, the types of group activities offered by the 
church, the effort required to get members to volunteer, and outreach 
programs that exist. Each of these series of questions may lend 
themselves to considering the price of affiliation via the time or effort 
that is required to participate. Thus, we will examine differences 
between responses from megachurches and non‐megachurches to gain 
insight into whether the data support the model. 
Evidence of low prices to attract seekers 
FACT 2000 investigates three questions, in particular, that we 
argue reflect evidence of low prices to bring seekers in. The questions 
ask: 
1.  About the number of services offered at different times during a 
weekend. 
2.  The variety of styles of services. 
3.  The types of group activities that exist in which attendees may 
participate. 
 
We maintain that a church that offers more services makes it 
cheaper for attendance since the potential member can find the time 
that is most accommodating to her schedule. In this way the full price 
of attendance is lowered by providing flexibility to the individual, 
thereby reducing the opportunity cost of attendance. The FACT 2000 
questionnaire asks how many services are offered on Friday, Saturday, 
Sunday morning, and Sunday afternoon. We calculate difference of 
means tests to examine what the differences between megachurches 
and non‐megachurches. The results are illustrated in Table I. 
 
The results show that for Saturday, Sunday morning, and Sunday 
afternoon, megachurches offer statistically significantly more services 
than non‐megachurches. Thus, we conclude that for these three time 
spans, megachurches succeed in lowering the price of religious 
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participation and make it easier for seekers to join the megachurch 
than the non‐megachurch. 
Next, we suggest a church that varies the style of service also 
reduces the price of attendance as a potential member can seek out 
the style and social group for which they are most comfortable. We 
see both of these aspects as a reduction in the “price” of attendance 
along the lines of Miller (2002, p. 445), who analyses the strategies of 
various religions and concludes that if a church reduces the demands 
placed upon potential customers it can “ease a potential customer into 
a religious organization”. He uses as Jewish Community Centers as an 
example of how an organization may secular activities as “non‐
threatening entry points” for disaffiliated Jews. Various styles of 
services and various secular‐activity groups will appeal to different age 
groups, ethnicities, and lifestyles. Ease of entry points reduces the 
demands on potential members and thus reduces the price of 
attendance. 
FACT 2000 asks a question for churches that hold more than 
one service per weekend, how varied or similar they are. The 
responses are coded as 1 being very similar, 2 being somewhat 
different, and 3 being a very different in style. Table II reports the 
comparison of results across churches. 
 
The results again suggest that megachurches are able to attract 
seekers through lower prices of attendance via a larger range of styles 
that are applied to the larger number of services offered. 
Finally, the church that offers group activities centered around a 
larger variety of interests makes it cheaper to participate because the 
larger the variety, the easier it is for a potential member to link a 
hobby or personal interest to her church life. Moreover, the more of 
these groups that are centered on activities that are typically secular 
based, the lower the price of participation the seeker will perceive. For 
example, if a megachurch member organizes a running club and 
invites a seeker (assumed to be a person who enjoys running) to run, 
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the cost of continued affiliation seems relatively low since the seeker 
enjoys running anyhow. Table III illustrates the percent of churches 
that offer various types of groups that would typically be considered 
based in a secular interest. 
 
We see that for each and every activity, a larger proportion of 
megachurches provide the group activity than non‐megachurches, and 
that the difference is highly statistically significant. Further, the 
difference is arithmetically particularly large for secularly based 
activities such fitness activities (a 59 percent difference) and sports 
teams (a 57 percent difference). 
An argument can be made that these groups are a function of a 
supply side effect suggesting a larger church can offer more groups 
than a small church, and that these differences are not an outgrowth 
of a deliberate strategy. To investigate this, we would ideally like to 
consider the number of groups that this sample of megachurches 
offered at times when they had fewer attendees (were not yet 
megachurches). Unfortunately, that is not possible. As a second best, 
we examined whether, in our sample, the megachurches were liberal, 
moderate, or evangelical. Our sample was comprised of 11 liberal, five 
moderate, and 104 evangelical megachurches. Since, as Warren 
(1995) makes very clear, groups were employed to draw religious 
refugees into the church and grow the church, we view the use of 
small groups as a process to help smaller churches grow into 
megachurches. 
Given that 87 percent of our megachurches are evangelical in 
our sample, we make the assumption that the many of the smaller 
evangelical churches in our sample are using groups to grow their 
church. In an effort to test the supply side theory we compare 
evangelical churches to non‐evangelical churches in four market sizes. 
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We define the “mini‐market” as churches with a weekly attendance of 
200 or fewer; “small market” as churches with attendance greater 
than 200 and up to and including 500; “medium market” as churches 
with attendance greater than 500 and up to and including 1,000; and 
“large market” as churches with attendance greater than 1,000 and up 
to 2,000. 
When we compare the proportions of evangelical to non‐
evangelical churches offering these groups, the turning point comes at 
the small market. Once the church experiences attendance rates 
between 200 and 500 weekly attendees, the evangelical churches have 
clearly established the use of small groups, in particular groups based 
in secular interests as a priority. Thus, it seems as though the supply 
side argument is viable when comparing churches with 200 or fewer 
attendees to larger churches, but is not relevant to comparing 
megachurches to the churches with greater than 200 attendees. 
Taken together, these data may suggest seeker‐oriented 
megachurches have found a strategy to lower the full price of 
participation for new attendees. This may, in fact be one reason that 
many see megachurches are “religion‐lite”, or a spectator religion. 
Thumma and Travis (2007), however, argue that this is not the case. 
They contend that members of megachurches actually pay a high full 
price for membership. Ease of entry remains for members, but the fill 
price of participation may rise through other costs, requirements, and 
commitments. 
Evidence of higher prices with deepened affiliation 
The model outlined above predicts that, subsequent to a seeker 
discovering a good fit, the church will raise its price. Though data do 
not exist to make precise comparisons of prices and costs, FACT 2000 
does lend itself to finding evidence of whether a megachurch does 
increase the full price of increased affiliation with the church. 
Specifically, the survey asks three questions that may be employed to 
test for higher prices of participation after time has passed and 
affiliation has deepened. The questions ask: 
1.  About the difficulty in getting people to volunteer. 
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2.  About the expectations of members' personal practices outside of 
church and general strictness. 
3.  About the existence of community outreach programs. 
 
Following Bird (2007), we argue that all these activities would 
be most relevant to attendees who are further in their process of 
affiliation, or in the context of our model, are individuals who already 
purchased the religious service at a “cheap” price, found a good fit, 
and are returning to the megachurch. As their affiliation continues, 
they become more involved and through time or effort and therefore 
pay a higher price for the religious good. 
The first question asks the respondent to characterize the ease 
or difficulty in motivating individuals to take leadership roles. Possible 
responses are that their congregation does not have any problem 
getting people to accept volunteer leadership roles (coded 1), that 
recruiting volunteers is a continual challenge, but that they do 
eventually find enough people (response coded 2), or that they cannot 
find enough people to volunteer (response coded 3). Table IV provides 
the results. 
 
Given that a lower number corresponds to greater ease of recruitment, 
the megachurches are able to recruit volunteers easier than non‐
megachurches. Thus, the price of affiliation rises given the additional 
time the attendee volunteers. 
The second question asks how much a congregation can expect 
of an individual's behavior outside of church services (i.e. in their 
home and personal practices). The five variables examined are 
personal prayer/scripture studies/devotions/other spiritual practices, 
family devotions, fasting, and abstaining from pre‐marital sex. The 
scores range from 1, associated with “Not at all”, to 5, associated with 
“A Great deal”. Table V provides the results of the difference of means 
tests. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
International Journal of Social Economics, Vol 39, No. 5 (March 2012): pg. 357-372. DOI. This article is © Emerald Group 
Publishing, Ltd. and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald Group 
Publishing, Ltd. does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without 
the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing, Ltd.. 
19 
 
 
The results suggest that megachurches do have statistically 
significantly higher expectations of home and personal practices in 
each of these categories. As a result, it can be inferred that the church 
is again raising the price for its more deeply affiliated members by 
expecting more of their behavior outside of church. 
Further, the questionnaire also asks which of the following 
statements best describes the congregation. The choices are: 
•  Our congregation has only implicit/vague expectations for members 
that are seldom, if ever, enforced (coded 1). 
•  Our congregation has fairly clear expectations for members, but the 
enforcement of these expectations is not very strict (coded 2). 
•  Our congregation has explicit/definite expectations for members that 
are strictly enforced (coded 3). 
 
The mean for the megachurch is 1.97 vs 1.78 for the non‐megachurch 
(p‐value of 0.014). Thus, again, we see that megachurches do expect 
more of their members than non‐megachurches. 
Another manifestation of a higher price of membership may be 
to engage in group activities that act as an outreach to the 
community. For example, volunteering at a soup kitchen, providing 
home health services, or engaging in prison ministry. We contend that 
participation in such groups demonstrates an individual's willingness to 
pay a higher price for membership to the church. The survey collected 
information on whether the church itself, or in conjunction with 
another organization provided groups across 16 different outreach 
programs. The responses were coded “1” for “No program”, and “2” for 
“Yes program”. The results are provided in Table VI. 
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The results indicate that across every outreach program, a larger 
proportion of megachurches provide the program than do non‐
megachurches. Consequently, we have additional evidence of 
increased price of membership after individuals discover a good fit 
between themselves and the megachurch. 
Analysis of the FACT 2000 survey results suggests that 
megachurches are, in part, successfully growing by bringing seekers 
into the church via a low initial price. This low price takes many forms. 
The megachurch offers a variety of services both in number and style, 
making it easier to for seekers to enter the church. Moreover, they 
offer church groups, many of which are based on otherwise secular 
interests. This, too, reduces the demands on a new attendee to 
discover whether the megachurch is a good fit. The data also show 
that for those that continue their affiliation having discovered a good 
fit, the megachurch demands more. The megachurch is able to 
demand more in terms of members taking on leadership roles, holding 
themselves to strict personal standards, and participating in 
community outreach groups[6]. 
V. Conclusion 
Megachurches continue to grow in the marketplace of the US 
religion as Americans increasingly assert their ability to switch 
religions. Megachurches are significantly different from more 
established and traditional churches in that they often have a flexible 
and modern look, downplay denominational affiliation, and employ 
otherwise secular activities in their programming. They also encourage 
new attendees to enjoy their services without significant commitment 
early in their affiliation. Their growth, thus, seems to contradict a 
significant amount of the literature that characterizes strict and high 
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commitment religions as those that will be successful and low 
commitment religions as those that will atrophy. 
This paper provides an economic model of pricing and quality 
signaling to explain the success of megachurches in attracting and 
retaining members. Megachurches employ a distinct strategy of 
reducing the full price of affiliation by providing different avenues that 
serve to ease a seeker's entry to the church, but then raise the full 
price after the seeker chooses to become a member. Survey results 
from FACT 2000 illustrate that megachurches provide more services 
and a greater variety of styles of services than non‐megachurches, 
both of which serve to reduce the full price of attendance. They further 
ease the entry by offering more church organized activities associated 
with secular interests than non‐megachurches do. The model 
demonstrates that as seekers respond to the lower full price of 
attendance, a portion of these seekers will find a good fit between 
their needs and what the megachurch offers. For those that continue 
their affiliation and become members, the megachurch can expect 
heightened participation and raise the full price of membership. The 
data show that, compared to members of non‐megachurches, 
members of megachurches perceive a higher required expectation of 
personal practices at home which serve to raise the full price of 
membership. Moreover, a larger proportion of megachurch members 
participate in outreach programs than non‐megachurch members. This 
also indicates an increased full price of membership. Last, 
megachurches have fewer difficulties of recruiting volunteers than non‐
megachurches, suggesting that the megachurch members are willing 
to spend more of their time involved with the church, and 
consequently pay a higher full price of membership. Taken together, 
the data reflect that megachurches initially reduce the full price of 
membership to bring seekers to the church, but are later able to 
increase the full price of membership for those that have found a good 
fit between their needs and what the megachurch offers. 
Future work in this area would benefit from repeating surveys 
like the FACT survey with the same churches over time and allowing 
for panel analysis. Further, surveying both the key informant as well 
as members of the church would allow for a better understanding of 
church strategies for growth as well as members' perceived needs and 
how the two forces interact. Last, such survey work would also help 
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researches better understand which members become a part of the 
committed core of a church, as discussed in Warren (1995). 
 
Notes 
If we allow for a switch from one form of Protestantism to another, 
this statistic rises to 44 percent. 
If 𝛱ℎ = 𝛾𝛿(𝑝2‐ 𝑐ℎ) − (𝑐ℎ‐ 𝑐𝑙) <  0, the high‐quality producer would have 
an incentive to produce the low‐quality fit product, would always 
charge cl and, therefore, could not use price as a signal of 
quality and commitment. 
It would be ideal to test the model by comparing prices of different 
services to costs of providing services at megachurches and 
non‐megachurches. Given that no such data are publicly 
available, we focus on data that allow us to infer relative prices 
of attending megachurches and non‐megachurches. 
We are indebted to Warren Bird whose 2007 PhD thesis made us 
aware of the data set and who also applied similar tests to some 
of these questions. Our results support and extend his results. 
While it may be argued that Historic Black churches may be treated as 
Protestant, and thus potentially be included in our megachurch 
sub‐sample, we follow Coreno (2002) and Welch et al. (2004), 
who argue for a separate classification for Black Protestant 
denominations because of the unique historical experience of 
black denominations. 
It may also be of interest to compare megachurches to just other 
Protestant churches, as one review suggested. When we do so, 
the analysis presented in this section is fully supported with the 
following exceptions. In Table I, compared to other Protestant 
churches, megachurches no longer offer more of services on 
Fridays or Sunday afternoons. Further, the increased style of 
services offered by megachurches, as referenced in Table II, is 
no longer statistically significantly greater than those offered by 
other Protestant churches. 
  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
International Journal of Social Economics, Vol 39, No. 5 (March 2012): pg. 357-372. DOI. This article is © Emerald Group 
Publishing, Ltd. and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald Group 
Publishing, Ltd. does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without 
the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing, Ltd.. 
23 
 
References 
1. Bird, W. (2007), “Megachurches as spectator religion: using social network 
theory and free‐rider theory to understand the spiritual vitality of 
America's largest‐attendance churches”, PhD thesis, Fordham 
University, New York, NY.  
 
2.Coreno, T. (2002), “Fundamentalism as a class culture”, Sociology of 
Religion, Vol. 63 No. 3, pp. 335‐60.  
 
3.Ekelund, R.B., Robert, F.H. and Robert, D.T. (2006), The Marketplace of 
Christianity, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.  
 
4.Iannaccone, L. (1992), “Sacrifice and stigma: reducing free riding in cults, 
communes, and other collectives”, The Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 100 No. 2, pp. 271‐91.  
 
5.Iannaccone, L. (1994), “Why strict churches are strong”, American Journal 
of Sociology, Vol. 99 No. 5, pp. 1180‐211.  
 
6.Kosmin, B.A. and Keysar, A. (2006), Religion in a Free Market: Religious 
and Non‐Religious Americans – Who, What, Why, and Where, 
Paramount Books, Ithaca, NY.  
 
7.Kreps, D.M. and Sobel, J. (1994), Signalling. Handbook of Game Theory 
with Economic Applications, Vol. II, Elsevier, New York, NY.  
 
8.Miller, K. (2002), “Competitive strategies of religious organization”, 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 23 No. 5, pp. 435‐56.  
 
9.Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2008), US Religious Landscape 
Survey, available at: http://religions.pewforum.org/reports.  
10.Roozen, D. (2000), Faith Communities Today, Association of Religion Data 
Archives, available at: www.TheArda.com.  
 
11.Thumma, S. (1996), “Exploring the megachurch phenomena: their 
characteristics and cultural context”, Excerpt from PhD dissertation, 
Emory University, available at: 
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/bookshelf/thumma_article2.html.  
 
12.Thumma, S. and Travis, D. (2007), Beyond Megachurch Myths: What Can 
Be Learned from America's Largest Churches.  
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
International Journal of Social Economics, Vol 39, No. 5 (March 2012): pg. 357-372. DOI. This article is © Emerald Group 
Publishing, Ltd. and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald Group 
Publishing, Ltd. does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without 
the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing, Ltd.. 
24 
 
13.Thumma, S., Travis, D. and Bird, W. (2005), “Megachurches today 2005”, 
available at: 
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/org/faith_megachurches_research.html#resea
rch.  
 
14.Tirole, J. (1995), The Theory of Industrial Organization, Hamilton Printing, 
Castleton, NY.  
 
15.Warren, R. (1995), The Purpose Driven Church, Zondervan, Grand Rapids, 
MI.  
 
16.Welch, M.R., Sikkink, D., Sartain, E. and Bond, C. (2004), “Trust in god 
and trust in man: the ambivalent role of religion in shaping dimensions 
of social trust”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 43 No. 
3, pp. 317‐44.  
 
